That’s, surprisingly, not the case at all! You can make non-exportable keys. The instance owner could, theoretically, change the published key for an account, but that would be visible.
They can, for sure. You need a few more bits to make it reasonably secure.
For this particular problem, a revocation key that isn’t accessible to the instance might be sufficient? That adds complexity and something else the user has to remember…
How would you make it secure? It seems like the home instance admin would be able to sign arbitrary messages whenever the user connects with a browser.
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That’s, surprisingly, not the case at all! You can make non-exportable keys. The instance owner could, theoretically, change the published key for an account, but that would be visible.
What prevents the malicious admin from telling the browser to sign arbitrary messages without exporting the keys?
They can, for sure. You need a few more bits to make it reasonably secure.
For this particular problem, a revocation key that isn’t accessible to the instance might be sufficient? That adds complexity and something else the user has to remember…
How would you make it secure? It seems like the home instance admin would be able to sign arbitrary messages whenever the user connects with a browser.
Indeed, yeah. You’d have to publish a message with your revocation key that disclaims the forgeries.
How would users see the forgeries? Presumably the malicious admin would filter them from their feed.
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